发表机构
Cambridge University（剑桥大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
提出一个易处理的亲社会规范模型，通过利他个体间的相互影响维持规范，并证明在有效利他大于不耐烦时存在对不良行为者稳健的均衡，且策略同质性增强稳健性，但增加观察者数量无益。
AI 中文摘要
我提出了一个新颖且易处理的大规模社群亲社会规范模型，其中包含轻微利他的个体。个体参与规范是为了影响他人参与规范，进而影响更多个体。连续的均衡维持着亲社会规范，其差异在于个体受其观察影响程度的分布。如果个体的有效利他系数α大于其不耐烦程度1-δ，则存在对不良行为者群体稳健的均衡。更大的策略同质性会增强规范的稳健性。将每个行为的观察者数量增加到1以上并不会提高稳健性。
英文摘要
I propose a novel, tractable model of pro-social norms in large communities with slightly altruistic agents. Agents participate in the norm to influence others to participate in the norm, influencing further agents. A continuum of equilibria sustain the pro-social norm, varying in the distribution of how much agents are influenced by their observations. If agents' effective altruism $α$ is larger than their impatience $1-δ$, equilibria exist that are robust to a population of bad actors. Greater strategic homogeneity increases the robustness of the norm. Robustness is not improved by increasing the number of observers of each action beyond 1.
