发表机构
York University（约克大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文通过确定性种群动力学模型，研究同行评审中阐释者与解释者的不对称行为，揭示了解释者可从少数派主导同行评审的机制，以及影响评审腐败是否可逆的制度条件。
AI 中文摘要
同行评审通常被视为一种质量控制机制。本文研究当参与者分为两个群体时会发生什么：阐释者（Explicators）评估投稿是否呈现基于逻辑的论证（无论是演绎、归纳还是溯因论证），独立于他们是否认同这些理由或结论；解释者（Interpreters）则根据自身立场评估投稿，他们对逻辑的运用是机会主义的，仅作为呈现自身观点的手段，而非评估他人观点的工具。本文采用确定性种群动力学模型，对“发表还是灭亡”的迭代博弈进行分析，结果显示这种不对称性使解释者即使作为少数派起步，也能提升其种群占比。研究比较了固定评审团与幸存者选拔评审团、不同的补充规则、阐释者对解释者的敌对反应、群体间的比例差异以及不同的评审团规模。在幸存者选拔评审机制下，阐释者对解释者的敌对态度会在阐释者占比为$q^* = 2 - \sqrt{3} \approx 0.2679$时产生不稳定均衡：低于该阈值，解释者无需阐释者合作即可生存并逐步走向主导。不过该阈值并非固定不变，若存在偏向阐释者的外生补充，可消除“无回头点”；而足够滞后的代际补充则能让阐释者在看似越过阈值后恢复。因此，该模型不仅明确了同行评审腐败的机制，还确定了决定这种腐败是自我维持还是可逆的制度条件。
英文摘要
Peer review is commonly treated as a mechanism of quality control. This article examines what happens when participants are split between two groups. Explicators assess whether submissions present logic-based arguments (whether deductive, inductive or abductive), independently of whether they agree with the reasons or the conclusion. Interpreters assess submissions according to their outlook. Their employment of logic is opportunistic, as a means of presenting their own views, but not as a means of assessing others' views. Using a deterministic population-dynamics model of iterative games of "Publish or Perish," this article shows how this asymmetry permits interpreters to increase their population share even when they begin as a small minority. It compares fixed and survivor-drawn reviewer panels, alternative replenishment rules, hostile explicator responses, generational differences in ratios, and different panel sizes. Under survivor-drawn review, explicator hostility to interpreters produces an unstable equilibrium at an explicator share of $q^* = 2 - \sqrt{3} \approx 0.2679$: below this threshold, interpreters can survive without explicator cooperation and continue toward dominance. The threshold is not universal, however. Exogenous replenishment in favour of explicators can eliminate the point of no return, and sufficiently lagged, generational replenishment can permit explicators to recover after it has apparently been crossed. The model therefore identifies not only a mechanism by which peer review becomes corrupted, but also the institutional conditions determining whether that corruption becomes self-sustaining or reversible.
