发表机构
University of Southern California; Harvard University（南加州大学; 哈佛大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
该论文研究含管理层自由裁量权的锦标赛，通过初始优势的三大渠道影响产出，最优契约设置恰好足够的初始优势以促使管理者雇佣最强候选人。
AI 中文摘要
我们研究在雇佣环节中具有管理层自由裁量权的锦标赛。一名管理者从候选人群中挑选一名同事，随后与其展开Lazear-Rosen型锦标赛，锦标赛的奖品为总产出的一定份额。追求利润最大化的委托人会设定奖品份额，同时为管理者提供一个初始优势（或劣势）——在产出比较中获得的优势（或劣势）。初始优势通过三个渠道影响产出：（i）激励管理者；（ii）打击新雇员的积极性；（iii）促使管理者雇佣更强的候选人。在雇佣到最强候选人之前，雇佣效应主导了打击效应；一旦雇佣到最强候选人，任何进一步的初始优势对新雇员的打击都会超过对管理者的激励。因此，最优契约会提供恰好足够大的初始优势，以促使管理者雇佣最强的候选人。
英文摘要
We study tournaments with managerial discretion in hiring. A manager selects a coworker from a pool of candidates and then competes against him in a Lazear--Rosen--style tournament with a prize equal to a share of total output. A profit-maximizing principal sets the prize share together with a head start (or handicap)---an advantage (or disadvantage) in the output comparison---granted to the manager. The head start affects output through three channels: (i) encouraging the manager, (ii) discouraging the new hire, and (iii) inducing the manager to hire a stronger candidate. The hiring effect dominates the discouragement effect until the strongest candidate is hired; beyond that point, any further head start discourages the new hire more than it encourages the manager. The optimal contract therefore grants a head start just large enough to induce the manager to hire the strongest candidate.
