战略中心性与核心-外围网络的形成

中文摘要 AI 辅助

我们研究一种网络形成博弈，其中智能体以线性成本建立链接，以最大化中心性，该中心性定义为带正负且弱递减权重的游走计数的加权和。此类中心性包含Katz Bonacich中心性和总通信性，捕捉了访问权限随距离衰减的环境。我们的主要结果是得到了清晰的均衡特征：每个纳什均衡网络都是核心-外围结构，即存在节点集C，每个节点都与C中的所有节点相连，且无其他边。驱动因素是与连接更好的智能体建立链接可一次性生成大量额外短连接，因此激励机制将链接集中在密集子集上。最后，我们证明社会福利最大化网络始终为空网络或完全网络。

英文摘要

We study a network formation game in which agents sponsor links at a linear cost in order to maximize centrality, defined as a weighted sum of walk counts with positive and weakly decreasing weights. This class includes Katz Bonacich centrality and total communicability and captures environments in which access decays with distance. Our main result is a sharp equilibrium characterization: every Nash equilibrium network is core periphery, meaning there exists a set $C$ such that every node is linked to every node in $C$, and there are no other edges. The driving force is that linking to better connected agents generates many additional short connections at once, so incentives concentrate links on a dense subset. Finally, we show that the welfare maximizing network is always either empty or complete.

发表机构

• University of Toronto（多伦多大学）
• Technion（以色列理工学院）
• FEP School of Economics and Management, University of Porto（波尔图大学经济与管理学院）

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