发表机构
Indiana University Kokomo（印第安纳大学科科莫分校）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
该研究强化了Rothberger游戏与实值连续函数空间上强闭离散游戏的信息对偶性，拓展了相关策略等价性理论并评述了次基选择游戏。
AI 中文摘要
我们强化了L. Chiozini近期证明的涉及空间及其关联实值连续函数空间的选择游戏等价性。该强化结果表明，Rothberger游戏是实值连续函数空间上强闭离散游戏的完美信息和马尔可夫信息对偶。在此过程中，我们拓展了涉及大覆盖的Menger和Rothberger游戏变体中第二玩家的策略等价性理论，同时明确指出大覆盖如何对应用作者此前论文中类似场景所用的策略转换结果构成严重阻碍。我们还简要评述了D. Guerrero Sánchez与V.V. Tkachuk引入的次基选择游戏。
英文摘要
We strengthen a recent selection game equivalence proved by L. Chiozini involving spaces and their associated spaces of continuous real-valued functions. This strengthening establishes that the Rothberger game is perfect- and Markov-information dual to the strong closed discrete game on the space of real-valued continuous functions. In the process, we extend the theory of strategic equivalences for the second player in variations of the Menger and Rothberger games involving large covers while noting explicitly how large covers present serious obstacles to applying strategy translation results used by the authors in similar scenarios in previous papers. We also briefly comment on subbasic selection games introduced by D. Guerrero Sánchez and V.V. Tkachuk.
Comments29 pages
