发表机构
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology; The University of Texas at Austin; AGH University of Krakow（阿卜杜拉国王科技大学; 德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校; 克拉科夫AGH科技大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文针对物联网技术应用下逆变器同步环路面临的隐蔽性基于参数的网络攻击，提出一种改进型锁相环，可在保留传统性能的同时检测此类攻击，实验验证了其有效性。
AI 中文摘要
物联网（IoT）技术在基于逆变器的资源（IBRs）监控与控制领域的日益整合，扩大了攻击面，使攻击者可通过易受攻击的监控控制接口对控制器参数进行隐蔽操纵。锁相环（PLL）成为主要攻击目标，因其与所有控制环路交互，且对网侧变流器（GFL）的动态响应有关键影响。本文分析了潜在威胁模型，阐明了实现此类隐蔽行为的机制，并开展了全面的稳定性与暂态响应分析，以表征PLL篡改如何在不一定使系统失稳的情况下降低系统性能。研究结果揭示了频率估计、控制与同步之间的关键交互，可显著降低稳定裕度。为应对此类攻击的隐蔽性，本文提出一种改进型PLL，其通过平衡点偏移暴露增益变化，同时保留传统PLL的性能。实验结果验证了该方法检测PLL网络攻击的有效性。
英文摘要
The increasing integration of Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies for monitoring and control of inverter-based resources (IBRs) has expanded the attack surface, enabling stealthy manipulation of controller parameters through vulnerable supervisory control interfaces. Phase-locked loops (PLLs) emerge as prime targets, as they interact with all control loops and critically influence the dynamic response of grid-following (GFL) converters. This paper analyzes the underlying threat model to elucidate the mechanisms enabling such stealthy behavior and conducts a thorough stability and transient response analysis to characterize how PLL tampering can degrade system performance without necessarily destabilizing the system. The results reveal critical interactions among frequency estimation, control, and synchronization that can significantly reduce stability margins. To counter the stealthy nature of these attacks, a modified PLL is proposed that exposes gain variations through shifts in its equilibrium points while preserving conventional PLL performance. Experimental results validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in detecting PLL cyber-attacks.
