发表机构
University of Toronto（多伦多大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文通过对纽康问题的具体分析，论证在无奇幻元素的场景中选两个盒子符合CDT，在近乎完美预测的奇幻场景中选一个盒子符合CDT，得出CDT在所有场景中均给出正确答案的结论。
AI 中文摘要
纽康问题历经57年的争论仍未达成共识，笔者认为这一失败源于未从具体角度分析该问题，而常识直觉显然适用于具体分析。若不要求近乎完美的预测，仅要求预测精度足以使证据决策理论（EDT）建议只选一个盒子，那么无任何奇幻元素的纽康场景实际上是可行的。笔者详细阐述了此类具体场景，其中决策者对预测过程拥有不同程度的信息，并认为在这些场景中，如因果决策理论（CDT）所建议的，选两个盒子是理性的。为使这一观点更具说服力，笔者引入了一个更简单的非个人化纽康问题，该问题同样有具体实现，以帮助将日常决策中的因果直觉与标准纽康场景相衔接。笔者还认为，具有近乎完美预测的纽康问题只能通过一种（当前属于奇幻的）过程实现，即预测者准确模拟参与者的思想。在功能主义的意识观下，这种模拟将是一个有意识的实体，其体验与“真实”人的体验无法区分。在该场景中，CDT建议选一个盒子。笔者总结道，当从具体角度对纽康问题进行恰当分析时，CDT在所有场景中都给出了正确答案。
英文摘要
Fifty-seven years of debate have not led to a consensus on Newcomb's problem. I argue that this failure comes from not viewing the problem in concrete terms, for which common-sense intuitions are clearly applicable. If near-perfect predictions are not required - only predictions good enough that Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) recommends taking only one box - Newcomb scenarios without any fantastic elements are actually feasible. I give a detailed account of such concrete scenarios, in which the decision-maker has varying amounts of information about the prediction process. I argue that in these scenarios it is rational to take both boxes, as Causal Decision Theory (CDT) recommends. To make this more convincing, I introduce a simpler impersonal Newcomb problem, also with a concrete realization, to help bridge causal intuitions from everyday decisions to the standard Newcomb scenario. I also argue that Newcomb's problem with nearly perfect predictions can only be realized by a (currently fantastic) process in which the Predictor accurately simulates the thoughts of a Participant. In a functionalist view of consciousness, this simulation will be a conscious entity, whose experience will not be distinguishable from that of a ``real'' person. In this scenario, CDT recommends taking one box. I conclude that when Newcomb's problem is properly analysed in concrete terms, CDT gives the correct answer in all scenarios.
