利用每核心泄漏：多核架构的电磁侧信道监测
Exploiting Per-Core Leakage: Electromagnetic Side-Channel Monitoring of Multicore Architectures
中文总结 AI 辅助
针对多核架构侧信道安全研究滞后的问题，揭示其电磁泄漏机制，首次实现每核心泄漏利用，提出非侵入式每核心粒度的侧信道监测方法并在树莓派4B上验证可行性。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
多核处理器因需满足日益增长的性能需求，正越来越多地被应用于嵌入式系统中。然而，对多核架构开展物理侧信道分析的研究仍较为欠缺，因为获取可用的泄漏信号本身就颇具挑战性。因此，这类系统的侧信道安全研究进展滞后，存在重大安全隐患。为解决这一问题，我们揭示了多核架构中的电磁泄漏机制，并首次实现了每核心泄漏的利用，从而为这类系统开展物理侧信道分析提供了可能。作为一项实用扩展，我们提出了一种非侵入式的侧信道监测方法，可达到每核心的粒度。为验证其可行性与实用性，我们在带有射频前端的异构片上系统（SoC）平台上实现了原型，并在商用现成的四核嵌入式系统——搭载ARM Cortex-A72核心的树莓派4B（Raspberry Pi 4B）上进行了评估。
英文摘要
Multicore processors are increasingly adopted in embedded systems to meet growing performance demands. However, physical side-channel analysis of multicore architectures remains underexplored, as obtaining usable leakage is inherently challenging. Consequently, side-channel security research on such systems has lagged far behind, leaving a critical security gap. To address this gap, we reveal the electromagnetic leakage mechanisms in multicore architectures and, for the first time, demonstrate per-core leakage exploitation, thereby enabling physical side-channel analysis for these systems. As a practical extension, we present a non-intrusive side-channel monitoring method that achieves per-core granularity. To validate its feasibility and practicality, we implement a prototype on a heterogeneous SoC platform with an RF front-end, and evaluate on a commercial off-the-shelf quad-core embedded system, the Raspberry Pi 4B with ARM Cortex-A72 cores.
