AI 中文总结
本文通过52年美国双重股权公司数据及双重差分法，分析双重股权将控制权与所有权分离的动态权衡，发现其重组后估值升但随时间降、创新产出持续增，对股票合并也有类似结果，为政策提供新启示。
AI 中文摘要
双重股权将控制权分配给那些凭借企业特定投资推动企业价值的创始人，但同时将控制权与所有权分离，引发代理成本。我们动态分析这种权衡，利用跨度52年的美国双重股权公司的新数据和双重差分法，发现双重股权资本重组后公司估值上升但随时间下降，而创新产出持续增加，这些效应集中在企业特定投资更多的行业。我们对股票合并也得到对应结果，成熟双重股权公司的投资对机会的敏感度更低，且投票溢价随公司成熟度上升。我们的结果支持动态处理效应，并产生新的政策启示。
英文摘要
Dual-class shares allocate control to founders whose firm-specific investments drive firm value but separate control from ownership, raising agency costs. We analyze this trade-off dynamically. Using new data on US dual-class firms spanning 52 years and difference-in-differences designs, we show that valuations rise following dual-class recapitalizations but decline over time, whereas innovative output increases persistently. These effects are concentrated in industries with greater firm-specific investments. We find corresponding results for stock unifications. Investment by mature dual-class firms is less sensitive to opportunities and voting premia increase with maturity. Our results support dynamic treatment effects and yield new policy implications.
