AI 中文总结
本文聚焦非大国冲突（NGPC）与AI风险，评估其作为灾难性风险来源的重要性，发现NGPC对大国冲突、灾难性恐怖主义的影响相关原假设不成立，提出需重点研究信息环境质量等五个中间变量。
AI 中文摘要
现有关于先进AI与战争风险的研究几乎全部聚焦于大国冲突，理由是拥有核武器的对手之间的对抗会带来最严重的灾难性或生存级危害。而针对非大国冲突（NGPC）的关注则少得多，非大国冲突包括非大国之间的战争、非大国与大国之间的战争、内战、代理人战争以及涉及非国家行为体的冲突。本文评估了一个原假设：在AI能力日益增强的时代，非大国冲突（NGPC）作为灾难性风险来源的重要性远低于大国冲突（GPC）；与之相对的备择假设是，其重要性与大国冲突（GPC）处于同一数量级。我们评估了三个子假设：非大国冲突会增加大国冲突的可能性；非大国冲突会增加灾难性恐怖主义的预期危害；非大国冲突会增加对先进AI系统失去控制的预期危害。我们发现，第一个和第二个子假设对应的原假设缺乏充分支持，而第三个子假设应作为进一步研究的优先事项，而非已确定的结论。我们还确定了在上述路径中反复出现的五个中间变量：信息环境质量、决策时间线压缩、大国威胁感知、能力扩散和规范侵蚀，并认为这些共享节点是进一步调查和干预的最高优先目标。
英文摘要
Research on advanced AI and the risk of war has focused almost exclusively on great power conflict, on the grounds that confrontation between nuclear-armed adversaries poses the greatest risk of catastrophic or existential harm. Considerably less attention has been paid to non-great-power conflict (NGPC): wars between non-great powers, between non-great powers and great powers, civil wars, proxy wars, and conflicts involving nonstate actors. This paper evaluates the null hypothesis that NGPC is much less important than great power conflict (GPC) as a source of catastrophic risk in an era of increasingly capable AI, against the alternative that it is within an order of magnitude of GPC in importance. We assess three sub-hypotheses: that NGPC increases the likelihood of great power conflict; that it increases the expected harm from catastrophic terrorism; and that it increases the expected harm from loss of control over advanced AI systems. We find the null poorly supported for H1 and H2, and identify H3 as a priority for further work rather than a settled finding. We also identify five intermediate variables that recur across the pathways - information environment quality, decision-making timeline compression, great power threat perception, capability diffusion, and norm erosion - and argue that these shared nodes are the highest-priority targets for further investigation and intervention.
