发表机构
Duke University（杜克大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
SonicNudge是一种通过估计器-控制器耦合，利用超声波共振对陀螺仪的微小扰动实现无人机受控位移的攻击原语，经仿真与实验验证，其可作用于需悬停等任务的无人机，拓展了车辆系统安全的攻击面。
AI 中文摘要
无人机位移攻击传统上依赖于欺骗直接报告位置或平移运动的传感器，如GNSS（全球导航卫星系统）和光流。在本研究中，我们提出了SonicNudge，这是一种新的攻击原语，它转而针对陀螺仪，并表明低级惯性误差可被转化为悬停或慢速移动无人机的受控位移。该攻击利用了估计器-控制器耦合：超声波共振对陀螺仪的微小扰动可作为姿态估计偏差持续存在，而飞行控制器可将该有偏差的估计转换为偏移的悬停点。这种行为对于需要悬停、定点保持、慢速接近或精确最终对齐的无人机任务尤为相关，如周边防护、巡检、对接、着陆对齐以及近距离操作，在这些任务中，米级的位置误差可能具有操作意义。我们在PX4风格的飞行栈中分析了该攻击原语，并通过81次仿真运行和超过10次室内/室外物理实验进行了验证，结果表明，位移受估计器权重、偏差可观测性以及闭环位置校正的控制。我们的研究表明，无人机及车辆系统安全应超越直接导航欺骗，更加关注低级惯性误差和估计器-控制器耦合这一微妙但重要的攻击面。
英文摘要
UAV displacement attacks have traditionally relied on spoofing sensors that directly report position or translational motion, such as GNSS and optical flow. In this work, we introduce SonicNudge, a new attack primitive that instead targets the gyroscope and shows that low-level inertial errors can be transformed into controlled displacement of hovering or slow-moving UAVs. The attack exploits estimator--controller coupling: a small gyroscope perturbation by ultrasonic resonance can persist as an attitude-estimation bias, and the flight controller can convert this biased estimate into a shifted hover point. This behavior is especially relevant to UAV tasks that require hovering, station-keeping, slow approach, or precise final alignment, such as perimeter denial, inspection, docking, landing alignment, and close-proximity operation, where meter-scale position errors can be operationally meaningful. We analyze this attack primitive in a PX4-style flight stack and validate it through 81 simulation runs and more than 10 indoor/outdoor physical experiments, showing that displacement is governed by estimator weighting, bias observability, and closed-loop position correction. Our study suggests that UAV and vehicle-system security should look beyond direct navigation spoofing and pay closer attention to low-level inertial errors and estimator--controller coupling as a subtle but important attack surface.
