参与、选择与成本高昂进入的拍卖中的指示性投标
Participation, selection and indicative bidding in auctions with costly entry
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该研究通过实验室实验，对比指示性投标、无限制进入与上限进入在成本高昂进入拍卖中的表现，发现高进入成本下指示性投标收益更高，低进入成本下其收益优势因选择低效减弱。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
我们研究了投标者在进入前对关联私人估值具有不完全信息的成本高昂进入的拍卖。我们检验指示性投标（一种要求进入前提交非约束性初步投标的机制）是否能刺激参与并改善进入者选择，并在受控实验室实验中将其表现与无限制进入和上限进入进行比较。当进入成本高时，指示性投标产生显著更高的收益，主要是通过将参与度提高到超出理论预测；当进入成本低时，其预测的收益优势因高于预测的选择效率低下而减弱。
英文摘要
We study auctions with costly entry in which bidders have incomplete information about their affiliated private valuations prior to entry. We examine whether indicative bidding--a mechanism requiring non-binding preliminary bids before entry--can stimulate participation and improve entrant selection, and we compare its performance with unrestricted and capped entry in a controlled laboratory experiment. When entry costs are high, indicative bidding generates significantly more revenue, primarily by increasing participation beyond theoretical predictions. When entry costs are low, its predicted revenue advantage is attenuated by higher-than-predicted selection inefficiency.
