AI 中文总结
本文从生命存在出发，论证多历史本体论更能解释生命存在的合理性，指出埃弗雷特量子力学是这类本体论的自然候选，并以费米悖论作为相关佐证。
AI 中文摘要
本文从生命存在这一事实出发，针对多历史本体论提出了一个简洁的条件论证。问题并非为何我们确切的进化序列会发生，而是为何现实中会包含承载生命的广泛历史类别。若此类历史足够稀少，那么单历史本体论会使生命的存在显得令人惊讶，而包含众多历史的本体论则可使其不足为奇。在极限情况下，生命在任意单一历史中可能极不可能发生，但如果众多历史被现实化，生命几乎必然会在某处出现。埃弗雷特量子力学是这类本体论的自然候选，因为其多重性并非为了人择目的而引入，而是源于对通用幺正量子力学的严肃对待。本文还讨论了费米悖论，将其作为对“生命在单一历史中普遍存在”这一主张的压力因素。
英文摘要
This essay develops a simple conditional argument for many-history ontologies from the fact that life exists. The question is not why our exact evolutionary sequence occurred, but why reality contains the broad class of life-bearing histories at all. If such histories are sufficiently rare, then a single-history ontology makes the existence of life surprising, while an ontology containing many histories can make it unsurprising. In the limiting case, life may be vanishingly unlikely in any one history while almost certain to occur somewhere if many histories are actualized. Everettian quantum mechanics is a natural candidate for this kind of ontology because its multiplicity is not introduced for anthropic purposes, but arises from taking universal unitary quantum mechanics seriously. The Fermi paradox is discussed as pressure against the claim that life is common within a single history.
