服务系统中的收益与社会福利最大化：独立顾客与分组顾客
Revenue and Social Welfare Maximization in Service Systems: Independent vs Grouped Customers
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中文总结 AI 辅助
针对服务系统收益最大化问题，对比独立顾客与分组顾客的情况，研究顾客合作对不可观测单服务台马尔可夫队列中加入或弃权困境的影响及其对社会福利和服务提供商收益的作用。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
带策略型顾客的服务系统收益最大化问题是理性排队文献中的核心问题，标准建模假设为顾客独立行动，因此该场景被建模为顾客与服务提供商之间的博弈。本研究聚焦顾客由其领导者分组控制的情况，此时场景变为顾客领导者与服务提供商之间的博弈。我们研究顾客合作对不可观测单服务台马尔可夫队列中加入或弃权（不执行）困境的影响，并分析其对社会福利及服务提供商收益的作用。
英文摘要
The revenue maximization problem in service systems with strategic customers is a central problem in the thread of Rational Queueing literature. The standard modeling assumption is that customers act independently and, therefore, the situation is modeled as a game among the customers and the service provider. In the present work, we focus on the case where the customers are grouped and controlled by their leader and the situation becomes a game between the customers' leader and the service provider. We examine the effect of customers' cooperation for the join-or-balk dilemma at the unobservable single-server Markovian queue and present the impact on the social welfare and service provider's revenue.
