AI 中文总结
该研究从理论与实验分析择校中优先级和录取机会的透明度对学生信息获取动机的影响，发现完全披露优先级或录取机会可提升福利，但学生对直接提供的录取机会存在反应偏差。
AI 中文摘要
我们从理论和实验两方面研究，在择校和大学录取中，关于学生优先级（priority）和录取机会（admission chances）的透明度如何影响学生获取自身偏好信息的动机。在该模型中，信息不足的学生基于共同先验选择学校；当他们了解自身偏好后，选择会更具异质性，从而在热门学校释放出更多名额。知晓自己优先级高的学生有更强的学习动机，因为他们能更轻易地将所学付诸行动；而知晓自己优先级低的学生则会被打消学习积极性。完全披露优先级会让学习集中在高优先级学生中；通过合并优先级，部分披露会将学习动机扩散至合并后的学生群体，带来更高的社会福利。然而在实验室实验中，完全披露反而带来最高的社会福利，其次是部分披露，最后是不披露，因为更高的透明度提升了受试者对策略环境的理解，减少了错误。这些发现支持完全披露优先级或录取机会以指导信息获取，但即便在更高的优先级透明度下，学习仍存在偏差，部分原因是受试者对直接提供而非自行推断的录取机会反应不佳，因此，学生解读和使用录取机会的能力本身也是一个政策关注点。
英文摘要
We study, theoretically and experimentally, how transparency about students' priorities and admission chances shapes their incentives to acquire information about their own preferences in school choice and college admissions. In the model, uninformed students choose schools based on a common prior. When they learn their own preferences, their choices become more heterogeneous, which frees up seats at popular schools. Students who know they have high priority have stronger incentives to learn because they can more readily act on what they learn, whereas students who know they have low priority are discouraged. Full priority disclosure concentrates learning among high-priority students. By pooling priorities, partial disclosure spreads learning incentives to pooled students and yields higher welfare. In the laboratory, however, full disclosure yields the highest welfare instead, followed by partial disclosure, and then no disclosure, because greater transparency improves subjects' understanding of the strategic environment, leading to fewer mistakes. These findings support full disclosure of priorities or admission chances to guide information acquisition. However, deviations in learning remain even under greater priority transparency, partly because subjects respond suboptimally to admission chances when these are provided directly rather than inferred. Students' ability to interpret and use them is therefore itself a policy concern.
