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arXiv 2608.18965cs.CR

谁能让行动落地?面向高风险自动化系统的权限分解框架

Who Can Make the Action Happen? An Authority-Decomposition Framework for High-Risk Automated Systems

Mengting Wu, Lin Wang, Yong Zhang

中文总结 AI 辅助

本文提出一种权限分解框架,用于推导高风险自动化系统中足以引发受保护执行的最小信任域联盟,通过Havenlon协议案例验证方法,并指出其为概念分析工具,不具备认证实现等功能。

中文摘要 AI 辅助

高风险自动化系统将控制权分布在服务、凭证、受保护组件和生命周期机制中。因此,“授权的”“批准的”“特权的”或“受保护的”等标签无法回答一个基本因果问题:哪些主体实际上能让具有重要影响的行动发生?本文提供了一种与行动相关的方法,用于推导哪些信任域联盟足以引发受保护执行,受保护执行被定义为指定的受保护状态转换的发生。该框架对组件、权限、资源、边界和替代实现结构进行建模;包含更新、恢复、覆盖、禁用和替代调用;并将对执行的因果控制与对操作权威账户的控制分离开来。它推导了包含最小充分联盟,并测试声称的执行边界是否仍独立于指定的上游域。跨域分析案例说明了该方法。在拆分控制、发布意图、开放状态、源受限的Havenlon协议模型中,普通证人需要五个信任域,而证书替换在源枚举的协议证人中产生了一个三域的包含最小已知要求集;Linux域对于完整转换仍然不足。部署的全局不可绕过性和边界绑定否决覆盖范围仍未解决。该框架是一种概念和分析工具,它不认证实现、建立部署安全性、保证完全发现隐藏权限,也不定义证据验证语义。

英文摘要

High-risk automated systems distribute control across services, credentials, protected components, and lifecycle mechanisms. Labels such as authorized, approved, privileged, or protected therefore do not answer a basic causal question: which actors can actually make a consequential action occur? This paper provides an action-relative method for deriving which trust-domain coalitions are sufficient to cause protected execution, defined as the occurrence of a designated protected state transition. The framework models components, powers, resources, boundaries, and alternative realization structures; includes update, recovery, override, disablement, and alternative invocation; and separates causal control over execution from control over the authoritative account of an operation. It derives inclusion-minimal sufficient coalitions and tests whether claimed execution boundaries remain independent of designated upstream domains. Cross-domain analytical cases illustrate the method. In a split-control, release-intended, open-state, source-bounded Havenlon protocol model, the ordinary witness requires five trust domains, while certificate replacement yields a three-domain inclusion-minimal known requirement set among source-enumerated protocol witnesses; the Linux domain remains insufficient for the complete transition. Deployed global non-bypassability and boundary-bound veto coverage remain unresolved. The framework is a conceptual and analytical tool. It does not certify implementations, establish deployment security, guarantee complete discovery of hidden powers, or define evidence-verification semantics.

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