AI 中文总结
该研究探究分布式需求响应系统中静态等价激励下的自适应参与，发现部分参与时的报酬是影响参与度的关键，分布式运行时可复现集中式结果并检测错误申报。
AI 中文摘要
聚合商通过结算规则和参与报酬招募分布式能源资源，这类设计通常在固定点验证：零参与必须不再是均衡，真实能力报告必须保持最优响应。本文探究这些检查是否决定了资源所有者从收到的结算中调整后达到的参与度。在一个包含5个单元、固定调度、支付规则和惩罚的场景中，仅改变稀缺性相关参与报酬随其他单元申报能力的衰减方式：两种衰减结构在全部5项静态标准上一致，但在8000轮周期内，一种从崩溃初始状态达到完全参与（96个种子中96个成功），另一种则完全未达到，二者的95%置信区间无重叠；差异源于静态标准从未评估的部分参与时的报酬，这是基于经验的反馈的属性，当提供反事实报酬时差异消失。由于这些报酬使每个单元的结算依赖于其他单元的申报，本文还探究机制分布式运行时的表现：将聚合商和5个单元作为独立进程运行，每轮均复现集中式参考结果，且在所有消息均送达的情况下仍检测到故意错误归属的申报。
英文摘要
Aggregators recruit distributed energy resources with settlement rules and participation payments. Such designs are normally validated at fixed points: zero participation must cease to be an equilibrium, and truthful capability reporting must remain a best reply. We ask whether those checks determine the participation that owners reach once they adapt from the settlements they receive. In a five-unit event with fixed dispatch, payment rule and penalty, we vary only how a scarcity-contingent participation payment decays with the capability others have declared. Of two decay structures that agree on all five static criteria, one reaches full participation from a collapse initialization in 96 of 96 seeds and the other in none, within an 8000-round horizon and with disjoint 95% confidence intervals. The difference lies in the payoffs offered at partial participation, which the static criteria never evaluate; it is a property of experience-based feedback and closes when counterfactual payoffs are supplied. Because those payoffs make each unit's settlement depend on what the others declared, we also ask what survives when the mechanism is distributed. Running the aggregator and the five units as separate processes reproduced the centralized reference at every round, and a deliberately misattributed declaration was detected although every message was delivered.
