单一在线市场中作为互补信任机制的声誉与机构认证
Reputation and institutional certification as complementary trust mechanisms in a single online market
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- The University of Tokyo（东京大学）
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science（日本学术振兴会）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
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中文总结 AI 辅助
通过分析eBay近百万张宝可梦卡牌的固定价格 listings，构建信号博弈模型，揭示声誉与机构认证在单笔交易中为替代关系、在市场层面为互补关系的机制。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
在信息不对称的情况下，声誉与机构认证是两种主要的信任机制，但其相互作用仍未得到充分理解。我们分析了eBay平台上近100万张宝可梦卡牌的固定价格 listings，卖家可选择三种信号：第三方评级（即机构认证）、自我评级（自称为条件描述）或不提供信号。研究表明，自我评级和第三方评级在声誉-价值空间中占据不同区域，且随着声誉提升，自我评级的区域会扩大。声誉还会放大自我评级带来的价格溢价，但不会放大第三方评级的价格溢价。我们构建了一个信号博弈模型，其中虚假自我声明会产生与声誉成正比的事后成本，而认证则产生与声誉无关的事前成本。这些成本将声誉-价值空间划分为均衡机制，能够解释上述两种模式。因此，这两种机制在单笔交易中是替代关系，但在整个市场中是互补关系，取代了声誉与机构的二分法，形成由声誉和价值决定的机制结构。
英文摘要
Reputation and institutional certification are the two main trust mechanisms under information asymmetry, yet their interaction remains poorly understood. Here we analyze nearly one million eBay listings of Pokemon trading cards. Each listing pairs the seller's reputation with their signal choice, that is, whether they used costly third-party certification, their own costless claim (self-grading), or neither to convey the card's quality. First, we find that certification and self-grading partition the market. Self-grading prevails where reputation is high and value low, whereas certification prevails in the market's opposite corner. Furthermore, seller reputation raises the price premium of self-grading but not of certification. We then show that both empirical patterns follow from a signaling model in which false self-grading damages reputation, whereas certification requires an up-front fee. These results suggest that, even within a single market, trust rests not on a choice between reputation and institutions but on a division of labor.
