AI 中文总结
该研究提出开放策略独裁者博弈，借助大语言模型裁决互动，通过循环锦标赛分析发现条件合作策略占优，证明在智能体可互查决策程序的环境中条件合作具备进化稳健性。
AI 中文摘要
我们提出了开放策略独裁者博弈（Open-Strategy Dictator Game，OSDG），这是经典独裁者博弈的变体，其中每个参与者的策略是一份对所有参与者可见的自然语言文档。独裁者的决策是“分享（SHARE）”还是“拿走（TAKE）”一笔禀赋，可取决于接收者策略的文本内容。一个大语言模型会结合接收者的策略文本，对独裁者的策略进行解读，以此裁决每一次互动。我们在多种策略间开展循环锦标赛，利用softmax均衡频率、优势分析以及对合作相对价值的敏感性分析，对生成的收益矩阵进行分析。条件合作策略（即与合作者分享、与剥削者拿走的策略）始终占据优势，而无条件策略（始终分享或始终拿走的策略）则处于弱劣势。研究结果表明，在智能体可相互检查决策程序的环境中，条件合作在广泛的收益参数范围内具备进化稳健性。
英文摘要
We introduce the Open-Strategy Dictator Game (OSDG), a variant of the classic dictator game in which each player's strategy is a natural-language document visible to all participants. The dictator's decision, to SHARE or TAKE an endowment, may depend on the text of the recipient's strategy. A large language model adjudicates each interaction by interpreting the dictator's strategy in the context of the recipient's. We run round-robin tournaments among diverse strategies and analyze the resulting payoff matrix using softmax equilibrium frequencies, dominance analysis, and sensitivity to the relative value of cooperation. Conditionally cooperative strategies, those that share with cooperators and take from exploiters, consistently dominate, while unconditional strategies (always share or always take) are weakly dominated. The results suggest that in environments where agents can inspect each other's decision procedures, conditional cooperation is evolutionarily robust across a wide range of payoff parameters.
