发表机构
University of Glasgow; Higher School of Economics; MIRAI（格拉斯哥大学; 高等经济学院; MIRAI）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文通过三阶段博弈模型研究有组织犯罪的分配规范与威慑问题，提出人口单调分配下最小威慑预算为最短瓦解路径成本，且夏普利值可唯一最大化该预算。
AI 中文摘要
在有组织犯罪中，成员变动速度最快，威慑能力变动较慢，分配规范变动最慢。我们将此建模为一个三阶段博弈：分配规范确定每个可能联盟如何分配收益；当局在知晓哪个联盟将形成前，为已命名成员配置威慑能力；最后，成员围绕未被威慑者调整。在人口单调分配下，最小威慑预算为每次移除一名成员的最短瓦解路径成本。当夏普利值是人口单调时，它通过使每条路径成本均等，唯一最大化该预算。
英文摘要
In organized crime, membership can adjust around enforcement while division norms remain in place. We model this in three stages: division norms fix how every possible coalition divides its proceeds; the authority then attaches deterrence capacity to named members before knowing which coalition will form; membership adjusts last, among those who remain undeterred. Under population-monotone division, where no incumbent loses rent as a coalition expands, the minimum budget needed to block every coalition is the cost of a shortest dismantling path, removing one member at a time. A high-rent hub can be the best first target because her removal lowers the rents of those who remain. Holding coalition proceeds fixed, the Shapley value applied to every coalition uniquely maximizes this budget among population-monotone norms whenever it is itself population monotone. It does so by making every removal order equally costly. Allowing part of the proceeds to be reallocated after capacities are observed weakly raises the budget for any fixed population-monotone norm, although exact Shapley optimality can fail even when the reallocated share is arbitrarily small.
