AI 中文总结
本研究提出一种基于可验证延迟的防御机制，可在分布式账本中预防多数MEV威胁，且在拜占庭环境与理性参与者模型中均有效，同时明确了该防御路线的局限性。
AI 中文摘要
本研究提出了一种针对分布式账本中最大可提取价值（MEV）机会的防御机制，该机制基于在生成交易时强制实施可验证延迟的思路，使区块创建者无法在不破坏活性的情况下对MEV机会的出现作出反应。我们在拜占庭环境和理性参与者的博弈论模型中均给出了正面结果，还提出了负面界限以阐明此类防御机制的局限性。最后，我们探讨了可验证延迟的现实实现细节，并基于历史MEV数据表明，该机制有望切实帮助预防多数现有MEV威胁。
英文摘要
Our work presents a defense mechanism against Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) opportunities in distributed ledgers. The mechanism relies on the idea of enforcing a verifiable delay when generating transactions, such that a block creator cannot react to the appearance of a MEV opportunity without breaking liveness. We present positive results both in the Byzantine setting and in a game theoretic model of rational participants. We additionally present negative bounds that outline the limitations of this line of defense. Finally, we explore real-world implementation details of verifiable delays and show that, based on historical MEV data, our mechanism could realistically help prevent most existing MEV threats.
CommentsA revised version is accepted for publication at the 10th International Workshop on Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technology (CBT 2026)
