超越说服：极化社会中的移动选举界面
Beyond persuasion: Mobile electoral interfaces in polarized societies
AI总结：
针对极化社会的选举竞争，提出以移动选举界面动态为核心的动力学模型，揭示选举流动性是系统对外部扰动响应的关键，说明选举变化主要源于移动界面波动而非意识形态转变。
AI中文摘要：
许多传统选举动态模型强调意见改变、社会影响与说服机制。相比之下，当代极化社会常呈现出相对稳定的党派集团，同时存在与选举相关的移动人口。我们提出一个极简动力学模型，其中选举竞争并非由对立集团间的直接说服决定，而是由移动选举界面的动态变化与分配决定。选民被划分为两个稳定的党派集团和一个移动部分，而极化集团间的直接转换受到强烈抑制。移动选民通过类费米概率规则在对立集团间分配，该规则由拒绝不对称性控制。分析计算表明，选举对政治冲击的敏感性与移动选举界面的稳态规模成正比，确定选举流动性是控制极化系统对外部扰动宏观响应的关键量。该模型自然预测了一系列流动性机制，从冻结极化到以宽移动界面为特征的高响应选举状态。这些结果表明，在高度极化的选举中，总体选举变化可能主要由移动选举界面的波动驱动，而非大规模意识形态转变。
英文摘要：
Many traditional models of electoral dynamics emphasize opinion change, social influence and persuasion mechanisms. In contrast, contemporary polarized societies often exhibit relatively stable partisan blocs coexisting with an electorally relevant mobile population. We propose a minimal dynamical model in which electoral competition is governed not by direct persuasion between opposing blocs, but by the dynamics and allocation of a mobile electoral interface. The electorate is partitioned into two stable partisan blocs and a mobile fraction, while direct transitions between the polarized blocs are strongly suppressed. Mobile voters are allocated between the competing blocs through a Fermi-like probabilistic rule governed by rejection asymmetries. Analytical calculations show that the electoral susceptibility to political shocks is proportional to the stationary size of the mobile electoral interface, identifying electoral mobility as the key quantity controlling the macroscopic response of polarized systems to external perturbations. The model naturally predicts a continuum of mobility regimes, ranging from frozen polarization to highly responsive electoral states characterized by a broad mobile interface. These results suggest that, in strongly polarized elections, aggregate electoral changes may be governed primarily by fluctuations at the mobile electoral interface rather than by large-scale ideological conversion.
