日程均衡
Schedule equilibria
浏览论文内容
中文总结 AI 辅助
本文研究一般均衡下的不完全竞争，推导家庭与企业最优条件，建立均衡存在性与颤抖手精炼，将框架应用于多场景，发现内生价格反应会改变相关标准结论。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
本文研究了一般均衡中的不完全竞争，此时家庭和企业选择价格相关的日程。市场出清由这些日程产生的价格决定，每个主体都会考虑自身行为如何改变均衡价格。我们推导了家庭和企业的最优条件，证明了均衡的存在性并建立了颤抖手精炼，还将该框架应用于垄断、垂直市场势力、进入、所有权和技术变革。结果表明，内生价格反应会改变关于加成、无谓损失、企业创建和投资的标准结论。
英文摘要
This paper studies general equilibrium when households and firms choose price-contingent schedules and market clearing determines prices. A unilateral schedule change therefore changes both an agent's realized allocation and the price at which it is evaluated. We call the resulting outcome a schedule equilibrium. The central object is the response of the clearing price to an agent's own schedule. This residual price response enters the household and firm first-order conditions, provides the strategic component of markups, and links conduct to observable equilibrium variation. We give conditions for existence, derive a trembling-hand refinement, and show how competitive, Cournot, and supply-function models arise as special cases. Applications to monopoly and vertical market power show how general-equilibrium feedback can alter familiar partial-equilibrium conclusions. We then allow firm mass, ownership, and technology to be endogenous. Free entry need not be efficient because entrants do not internalize their effect on the rest of the economy. Households choose capitalization and thereby ownership and firm creation, while investment moves active firms through production-function space. The same price-response mechanism therefore links market power, entry, ownership, and technological change within a common general-equilibrium framework.
