去中心化基础设施协议中激励机制的重复博弈框架
A Repeated-Game Framework for Incentives in Decentralized Infrastructure Protocols
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该研究针对DePIN提出重复博弈激励框架，定义威慑比Γ，推导合规性序列激励相容条件，用于设计协议的质押、奖励、试用期及审计规则。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
我们提出一种重复动态激励框架，用于刻画在去中心化物理基础设施网络（DePIN）中，“合规”（即全力提供诚实服务）何时具备激励相容性。我们将该场景下的质量控制建模为协议与每个提供者之间的重复道德风险问题，其中合规性通过扣除已质押保证金，以及将其降级至声誉阶梯上的试用期层级的贴现威胁来强制执行。我们的主要贡献是“威慑比”Γ，即偏离行为的私人收益与其被检测的边际概率的最坏情况比值。我们发现，若任何有利可图的偏离行为相较于合规性并未增加失败概率，则二元公共结果协议无法对其形成威慑。当所有有利可图的偏离行为均具有正检测缺口，且无成本弱更高的行动更不易失败时，合规性是序列激励相容的，当且仅当在每个声誉层级上，即时扣除保证金加上贴现声誉损失至少为Γ。我们利用该条件构建协议设计问题，将服务原语映射至质押要求、奖励计划、试用期规则及审计频率。
英文摘要
We introduce a repeated dynamic incentive framework for characterizing when "compliance", or full-effort honest service provision, is incentive compatible in Decentralized Physical Infrastructure Networks (DePIN). We model quality control in this setting as a repeated moral-hazard problem between the protocol and each provider, where compliance is enforced by both slashing posted collateral and the discounted threat of demotion to probation tiers on a reputation ladder. Our main contribution is the "deterrence ratio" $Γ$, the worst-case ratio of a deviation's private gain to its marginal probability of detection. We find that if any profitable deviation does not increase the fail probability relative to compliance, then binary public-outcome protocols cannot deter it. When all profitable deviations have positive detection gaps and no weakly costlier action is less likely to fail, compliance is sequentially incentive compatible if and only if immediate slashing plus discounted reputation loss is at least $Γ$ at every reputation tier. We use this condition to formulate a protocol design problem mapping service primitives to stake requirements, reward schedules, probation rules, and audit frequency.
