算法透明度与搜索操纵：引导与说服
Algorithm Transparency and Search Manipulation: Steering vs. Persuasion
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文研究平台通过算法操纵消费者注意力，发现算法透明度会影响消费者福利，扩大或调整透明度要求会分离引导与信息提供，使消费者福利回到不透明状态。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
本文研究一个倾向于销售两种产品中更盈利产品的平台。该平台设计了一种算法，根据消费者的最佳匹配情况，确定消费者首先遇到的产品。该算法同时操纵消费者注意力（即引导）并传递匹配质量的信息（即告知）。当算法不透明时，消费者很难理解产品顺序是如何生成的以及算法揭示了什么。在平台偏好的均衡中，平台会将盈利产品放在首位。当算法透明时，消费者能够理解该算法及其所传递的信息，因此算法既能说服又能引导。在某些情况下，均衡算法会阻止搜索，而在另一些情况下则会鼓励搜索。在前一种情况下，透明度对消费者有利；在后一种情况下，透明度会损害部分或全部消费者的利益。扩大或调整透明度要求会将引导与信息提供分离开来，使消费者的福利回到不透明时的水平。
英文摘要
We study a platform that prefers to sell the more profitable of two products. It designs an algorithm that determines the product the consumer encounters first, conditional on her best match. The algorithm simultaneously manipulates consumer attention (steers) and communicates information about match quality (informs). When the algorithm is opaque, it is difficult for a consumer to understand how product order is generated and what it reveals. In the platform's preferred equilibrium, it places the profitable product first. When the algorithm is transparent, the consumer understands the algorithm and what it conveys. Thus, the algorithm can persuade as well as steer. In some cases, the equilibrium algorithm deters search, in others, encourages it. In the former case, transparency helps consumers; in the latter, it harms some or all of them. Extending or shifting transparency requirements uncouples steering from information provision, reverting the consumer's welfare to opacity.
