发表机构
Politecnico di Milano; RFF-CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment; Instituto de Investigacion Tecnologica; Universidad Pontificia Comillas（米兰理工大学; RFF-CMCC欧洲经济与环境研究所; 技术研究所; 康普卢滕斯天主教大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文以意大利2026年《Decreto Bollette》法案为案例，采用MARLEY框架评估碳价抑制对电力部门脱碳的影响，发现该政策短期降本但长期减排效果差，仅在高绿色投资支持下可避免排放上升，却需采用与干预初衷矛盾的混合市场范式。
AI 中文摘要
欧洲各国在应对地缘政治紧张局势加剧导致的能源成本上升的同时，还在讨论旨在推进脱碳与电气化的政策。一个典型案例是意大利2026年的《Decreto Bollette》法案，该法案提议从部分燃气发电厂在电力批发市场的投标中扣除碳价等价额等内容。本文以该法案为案例，评估电力市场中碳价信号抑制对投资、排放和消费者成本的长期影响。本文采用MARLEY（一个专注于长期电力市场评估的多智能体强化学习框架）构建简化的意大利电力系统，并在绿色投资支持力度、资源充足性及灵活性水平不同的配置下测试该政策。结果显示，部分碳价信号抑制可实现短期成本降低，但对总系统成本的长期影响极小，因为延迟的排放最终将由消费者承担；在大多数配置下CO₂排放量上升，原因是碳价信号抑制削弱了对可再生能源和储能投资的激励；只有在支持绿色投资力度最大的配置下才能避免这一结果，但需通过弱化电力批发市场价格信号实现，这要求采用混合市场范式，与拟议价格干预措施的初衷相矛盾。
英文摘要
European countries are debating policies to mitigate the increased energy costs caused by renewed geopolitical tensions, while pursuing decarbonization and electrification. A notable example is Italy's 2026 Decreto Bollette package, which proposes to remove the carbon price equivalent from the bids of certain gas-driven power plants to wholesale electricity markets, among other provisions. We use this as a case study to assess the long-term implications of suppressing the carbon price signal in the electricity market for investment, emissions, and consumer costs. We employ a stylized Italian power system using MARLEY, a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework focused on long-term electricity market assessments. In this framework, we test this policy across configurations with varying levels of support for green investment, resource adequacy, and flexibility. Results show that partial suppression of the carbon price signal yields short-term cost reductions but only a minor long-term effect on total system costs, as the deferred emissions are ultimately repaid by consumers. CO$_2$ emissions rise across most configurations since suppressing the price signal erodes incentives for renewable and storage investment. Only the most ambitious configurations for supporting green investment avoid this outcome, but they do so by marginalizing the wholesale price signal itself, thereby requiring a commitment to a hybrid market paradigm that is in contradiction with the rationale of the proposed price intervention.
Comments58 pages, 12 figures, 12 tables. Includes supplementary material
