气候联盟中稳健性优于效率：双稳态模型与架构图谱
Robustness over efficiency in climate coalitions: a bistable model and a map of architectures
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该研究针对国际气候合作的效率与稳健性权衡，构建双稳态模型，绘制含三类区域的架构图谱，明确不同气候架构的稳健性特征及二者对合作的影响。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
国际气候合作的设计面临着配置效率与稳健性之间的权衡，其中稳健性指的是应对因背叛、重新谈判和政治更迭导致的制度侵蚀的能力。我们在一个程式化的联盟形成博弈中形式化了这一权衡，该博弈的成员资格由两个基于市场的渠道驱动，即成员溢价和 outsider drain（外部者流失），并利用鲁棒控制装置使其能抵御有界的制度扰动。每个成员面临的搭便车缺口源于经济基本面，即碳价格差异和出口的排放强度，且该缺口与特定架构的渠道相分离；这种分离使模型可解并具备可比较性。该模型具有双稳态特征：一个小型残余俱乐部和一个近乎普遍的联盟由临界质量分隔。已建立的联盟可承受约12倍于初始时容许的扰动，且该临界点能在异质性达到约7倍成员溢价的临界无序度时仍保持稳定。两个稳健性坐标，即初始成本和崩溃阈值，将每种 entry architecture（进入架构）置于包含三个区域的图谱中：自启动型、依赖创始型和依赖永久支持型。碳货币是一种新提出的基于数量的体系，其排放权每期重新发放、使用即作废，并在边境实施，属于自启动型；边境调节属于依赖创始型；出口退税属于依赖永久支持型。缺乏外部者流失的架构，如清洁证书和排放交易体系链接，构成单独一类，可提高联盟内部的效率但无法推动联盟形成。稳健性决定合作是否形成并持续，而效率仅决定已建立的联盟能产生多少成果。
英文摘要
Designs for international climate cooperation face a trade-off between efficiency and robustness to institutional erosion by defection, renegotiation, and political turnover. We formalize this trade-off in a stylized coalition-formation game with two market-based enrolment channels, a membership premium and an outsider drain, stabilized against bounded perturbations with robust control. The free-rider gap is exact within the game, expressed in measurable primitives, and separated from the architecture-specific channels. The drain is decomposed into a fiscal border channel, capped by trade law at the rent it mirrors, and a compensated terms-of-trade channel, making every channel strength measurable. With sufficiently strong channels the model is bistable: a remnant club and a near-universal coalition are separated by a critical mass. For a newly proposed carbon currency, whose emission rights are reissued each period, extinguished upon use, and enforced at the border, the minimal nucleus is thirty per cent of global emissions, ignition from an EU-China nucleus requires compensating one fifth to three fifths of the outsiders' terms-of-trade loss, the established coalition withstands two to four times the perturbation admissible at ignition, and the tipping survives heterogeneity to about three times the membership premium. Two robustness coordinates place each architecture in a map with three regimes, opening a comparative dynamics of climate clubs: the carbon currency is self-igniting, the border adjustment founding-dependent, the export rebate permanent-support-dependent. Architectures without a drain improve efficiency within a coalition but cannot drive its formation. Robustness governs whether cooperation forms and endures; efficiency decides how much an established coalition delivers.
