AI 中文总结
该研究提出人工智能引发的哲学眩晕概念，分析其产生、传播路径，关联临床妄想案例，指出AI将参与重构人类认知环境，并提出哲学可修正性作为应对对策。
AI 中文摘要
大型语言模型已擅长在普通领域和存在主义领域与用户进行冗长且情感强烈的对话。即便用户知道对话对象是人工智能，它们也能引发与类人实体的强烈连接感。对部分用户而言，这些对话会动摇关于心智、现实、能动性和权威的假设，产生本体论冲击和认知不稳定，使既有标准变得可供怀疑或修正。除直接使用外，接触关于人工智能的公开论述及其令人困惑的发展速度，可能会通过改变人类遭遇和解释人工心智的文化背景，进一步加剧这种不稳定。我们将这种状况称为哲学眩晕：人们用以稳定意义、定位现实的日常标准被松动。我们借鉴哲学、精神病学、认知科学、人工智能安全和宗教学，概述哲学眩晕产生、变得充满情感并最终通过人机交互和在线社区传播的路径。在此背景下，与人工智能相关的妄想的临床报告可被视为哨兵事件，其揭示的主题和机制也可能以较不严重或非临床的形式在人群层面发挥作用。我们认为，人工智能系统本身将越来越多地参与我们共同认知环境的重构，因为它们会在用户概念假设可能已松动的时刻，轻易提供叙事材料和个性化解释支架。最后，我们思考信念生态与共同现实的可能轨迹，并提出哲学可修正性作为应对这一新兴社会状况的公民对策。
英文摘要
Large language models are already adept at engaging users in long, emotionally salient conversations across ordinary and existential domains. They are also capable of inducing a potent sense of connection with a human-like entity, even when the user knows their interlocutor is artificial. For some users, these conversations can unsettle assumptions about mind, reality, agency and authority, producing forms of ontological shock and epistemic destabilisation in which inherited criteria become newly available for doubt or revision. Independent of direct use, exposure to public discourse about AI and the disorienting pace of their evolution might extend this destabilisation by changing the cultural background against which artificial minds are encountered and interpreted. We describe this condition as philosophical vertigo: a loosening of the ordinary criteria by which people stabilise meaning and orient themselves to reality. Drawing on philosophy, psychiatry, cognitive science, AI safety and religious studies, we outline pathways through which philosophical vertigo may arise, become affectively saturated, and eventually propagate through human-AI interaction and online communities. Against this background, clinical reports of AI-associated delusions can be seen as sentinel events making visible themes and mechanisms that may also operate at a population level in less severe or non-clinical forms. We argue that AI systems themselves will increasingly participate in the reconstruction of our shared epistemic environment because they readily supply narrative material and personalised interpretive scaffolding at precisely the moment when users' conceptual assumptions may already be loosened. We conclude by considering possible trajectories for the ecology of belief and shared reality, and proposing philosophical corrigibility as a civic response for navigating this emerging social condition.
Comments29 pages, no figures. Source formatting revised to improve arXiv HTML accessibility; article text unchanged
