arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~

针对后过滤访问控制的明文恢复

Plaintext Recovery Against Post-Filtering Access Control

Zachary Espiritu, David Cash

arXiv 2608.11730首次发表:更新:

AI 中文总结

本文针对数据库后过滤访问控制的侧信道,利用丰富查询接口将存在性泄漏放大为重建攻击,在PostgreSQL和Elasticsearch/OpenSearch场景下实现高熵记录的高效恢复,凸显FGAC侧信道评估需考虑丰富谓词的必要性。

AI 中文摘要

细粒度访问控制(FGAC)机制,如行级安全(RLS)和文档级安全(DLS),被广泛部署在数据库中,以限制多个用户共享的物理索引结构中存储的数据访问(例如多租户数据库,或组织内最小权限的实现)。FGAC实现常采用后过滤方式,即不可信查询在所有数据上运行,之后对私有结果进行编辑。现有研究表明,该方法会产生侧信道,使攻击者能测试选定值是否存在于未查看的数据中。尽管存在危害,但现有攻击无法高效恢复高熵的丰富数据,如完整记录或文本文档。本文表明这些侧信道的危害比此前认为的更大:利用丰富的查询接口(如范围、前缀和合取谓词),可将存在性泄漏放大为重建攻击,具体在两种场景下实现:1. PostgreSQL(RLS时序):利用时序侧信道和表达性SQL查询(如范围、合取),通过对大域进行二分法搜索枚举未知属性值,进而恢复完整记录;2. Elasticsearch/OpenSearch(DLS评分):利用评分和前缀扩展侧信道恢复文档中的索引词,部分情况下可提取语料库中的n元语法以恢复近似文本。研究结果表明,FGAC侧信道需在存在丰富谓词的情况下进行评估,此类谓词可将成员测试转化为高熵记录的可扩展重建。

英文摘要

Fine-grained access control (FGAC) mechanisms such as row-level security (RLS) and document-level security (DLS) are widely deployed in databases to restrict access to data stored in physical indexing structures shared by multiple users (e.g., in multi-tenant databases, or in the implementation of least-privilege within an organization). FGAC implementations often use post-filtering where untrusted queries run over all data and private results are redacted afterwards. Prior work shows this approach can lead to side-channels that enable attackers to test if a chosen value exists in unseen data. While damaging, prior attacks do not enable the efficient recovery of rich, high-entropy data like full records or text documents. We show these side-channels are more damaging than previously thought. Using rich query interfaces (e.g., range, prefix, and conjunctive predicates), we amplify existence leakage into reconstruction attacks. We do this in two settings: - PostgreSQL (RLS timing). We exploit a timing side-channel and expressive SQL queries (e.g., ranges, conjunctions) to enumerate unknown attribute values and, in turn, full records via binary search over large domains. - Elasticsearch/OpenSearch (DLS scoring). We exploit scoring and prefix-expansion side-channels to recover indexed terms from documents. In some cases, we can extract $n$-grams in the corpus to recover approximate text. Our results show that FGAC side-channels must be evaluated in the presence of rich predicates, which can turn membership tests into scalable reconstruction of high-entropy records.

Comments21 pages, 5 figures, 6 tables. Full version of https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/espiritu

Journal refProceedings of the 35th USENIX Security Symposium (2026), 3753-3772

论文原文

arXiv 摘要页 · PDF 原文 · HTML 原文

↑