基于量子硬件假设的统计安全位承诺与抛币协议
Statistically-Secure Bit Commitment and Coin Flipping Protocols Based on Quantum Hardware Assumptions
AI总结：
该研究基于混合锁定物理不可克隆函数（HLPUF）构建出统计安全的位承诺与首个硬件抛币协议，为量子网络安全两方密码学提供了新范式。
AI中文摘要：
位承诺即使在量子密码学中也无法实现无条件安全。我们表明，可同时满足隐藏性和绑定性的统计安全位承诺，可由混合锁定物理不可克隆函数（HLPUF，一种结合经典硬件令牌与量子通信的硬件原语）构建。我们的协议以新颖且非平凡的方式运用这些硬件假设，实现了首个基于混合硬件模块的互不信任两方密码协议。我们在对HLPUF的自然假设下，通过精心设计的挑战生成算法作为位承诺协议的子例程，证明了其统计隐藏性与绑定性。该构造还产生了首个基于硬件的抛币协议。我们的结果为量子网络中的安全两方密码学提出了新范式，兼具严格安全保障与实际实现的具体路径。
英文摘要：
Bit commitment is impossible to achieve with unconditional security, even in quantum cryptogra- phy. We show that statistically secure bit commitment, satisfying both hiding and binding, can be constructed from hybrid locked physical unclonable functions (HLPUFs), a hardware primitive that combines classical hardware tokens and quantum communication. Our protocol uses these hardware assumptions in a novel and non-trivial way to achieve the first mistrustful two-party cryptographic protocol based on hybrid hardware modules. We prove statistical hiding and binding under natu- ral assumptions on the HLPUF and using a carefully designed challenge generation algorithm as a subroutine of our bit-commitment protocol. The construction also yields the first hardware-based coin-flipping protocol. Our results suggest a new paradigm for secure two-party cryptography in quantum networks, combining rigorous security guarantees with a concrete route toward practical implementation.
