AI 中文总结
针对存在基选择先验或测量结果后验信息泄露的 prepare-and-measure QKD，提出基于相位误差估计的简单有限密钥安全性证明，该证明仅需侧信道态可区分性界定，模块化且兼容现有缺陷处理证明，适用于多种实用 QKD 实现。
AI 中文摘要
实用量子密钥分发（QKD）接收机可能会向信道泄露关于其测量结果和设置的信息，例如通过探测器后向闪光或后向反射的特洛伊木马光，这可能会损害协议的安全性。本文针对存在基选择的先验信息泄露和/或测量结果的后验信息泄露的 prepare-and-measure QKD，提出了一种基于相位误差估计的简单有限密钥安全性证明。该证明仅需要对侧信道态的可区分性进行界定。此外，该分析具有模块化，可与解决探测器和源缺陷的现有安全性证明兼容，使其适用于广泛的实用 QKD 实现。
英文摘要
Practical quantum key distribution (QKD) receivers may leak information about their measurement outcomes and settings to the channel (e.g., through detector backflashes or back-reflected Trojan-horse light) that could compromise the protocol's security. Here we present a simple finite-key security proof based on phase-error estimation for prepare-and-measure QKD in the presence of either a priori information leakage about the basis choices and/or a posteriori information leakage about the measurement outcomes. The proof requires only a bound on the distinguishability of the side-channel states. Furthermore, the analysis is modular and compatible with existing security proofs that address detector and source imperfections, making it applicable to a wide range of practical QKD implementations.
Comments12 pages, 2 figures
