AI 中文总结
针对无货币转移、代理人未完全内化成本的委托代理项目决策问题，研究提出委托人最优机制无需代理人报告，可选择忽略代理人或赋予其免费信息与完全决策权威。
AI 中文摘要
委托人需决定是否实施一项项目，其私人知晓项目成本，代理人私人知晓项目收益，不存在货币转移，且相比委托人，代理人未完全内化成本。研究表明，委托人最优机制无需代理人报告，而是要么忽略代理人，要么赋予代理人免费信息与完全决策权威。
英文摘要
A principal must decide whether to implement a project. She privately knows the cost, an agent privately knows the benefit. Monetary transfers are not available, and compared to the principal, the agent does not fully internalize the cost. We show that the principal-optimal mechanism does not require the agent to report. Instead, it either ignores the agent or endows the agent with free information and full decision authority.
