AI 中文总结
本文针对军事能力与软件迭代的生命周期悖论，提出以DevOps风格循环为核心的SDD路径，明确多主体责任与三阶段建议，旨在解决国防领域软件迭代滞后问题。
AI 中文摘要
军事能力正日益由软件决定，但国防平台的采购周期长达数十年，而其搭载的软件和AI模型却需在数天或数小时内完成迭代，本文将这种不匹配称为生命周期悖论，并指出这是软件定义国防（SDD）必须解决的核心问题。SDD涵盖三个维度：软件与系统工程（设计、采购、认证）、AI工程（学习组件的主权与可信度）、连接与基础设施工程（传感器、AI与操作人员间的及时信息交换）。实现弹性SDD的路径始于民用技术，通过持续的DevOps风格循环推进：基于模型的系统工程与基于仿真的测试将设计与验证前置；战术连接与低功耗边缘执行将该设计应用于对抗环境作战；持续合规、保障与可变性管理作为跨领域关注点运行。该循环可依托汽车、制造、航天和能源领域已验证的能力实现可持续性，下一步需在对抗环境或国防认证条件下验证这些能力，通过短期、中期和长期路径缩小差距。在保留民用利益的同时缩小SDD差距是多方责任：研究人员需将方法转向对抗环境；行业需向作战需求开放工具；政策制定者需制定监管工具；国防机构需与操作人员共同验证结果。建议涵盖三个阶段：短期为对抗测试与连接试点的基线；中期为增量认证的管道；长期为在作战条件下闭合循环的验证。
英文摘要
Military capability is increasingly determined by software. Yet defence platforms are procured on decade-long timescales, while the software and AI models they carry must evolve in days or hours. This paper calls this mismatch the lifecycle paradox, and argues it is the central problem Software-Defined Defence (SDD) must solve. SDD rests on three dimensions: software and systems engineering (design, procurement, certification), AI engineering (sovereignty and trust of learned components), and connectivity and infrastructure engineering (timely exchange of information among sensors, AI, and operators). The proposed path to resilient SDD starts from civilian technologies, addressed through a continuous, DevOps-style loop: model-based systems engineering and simulation-based testing front-load design and verification; tactical connectivity and low-power edge execution carry that design into contested operation; continuous compliance, assurance, and variability management run as cross-cutting concerns. This loop is sustainable given capabilities already proven in automotive, manufacturing, space, and energy. The next step is validating them under adversarial or defence-certified conditions, with short-, medium-, and long-term paths to closing gaps. Closing the SDD gap while preserving civic benefits is a distributed responsibility: researchers must redirect methods toward adversarial conditions; industry must expose tooling to operational needs; policymakers must shape regulatory instruments; and defence agencies must validate results with operators. Recommendations span three horizons: a short-term baseline of adversarial testing and connectivity pilots; a medium-term pipeline of incremental certification; and a long-term validation closing the loop under operational conditions.
