AI 中文总结
本文研究带转移支付的联盟讨价还价问题，构建更丰富的联盟博弈模型，发现沙普利值经典公理化失效，经补充连续性和强化哑元性质公理后实现其公理化。
AI 中文摘要
我们考虑主体间可进行转移支付时的讨价还价问题。这类情况通常被建模为带有可转移效用的联盟博弈，但该模型隐含一个强假设：结果仅取决于每个主体联盟可实现的总剩余，而非联盟内部哪些主体产生了剩余。这一假设是否成立？我们定义了一个更丰富的模型，其中解可能取决于剩余的产生者。在该模型中，沙普利值的经典公理化失效：广泛的解族满足效率、匿名性、哑元性质和可加性。不过，我们通过在原有公理中加入连续性和哑元性质的强化形式，在该更丰富的模型中获得了沙普利值的公理化。
英文摘要
We consider the problem of bargaining when transfers between agents are possible. Such situations are typically modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities. However this model makes a strong implicit assumption: the outcome can only depend on the total surplus that each coalition of agents can achieve, not on which agents within the coalition generate the surplus. Is this assumption justified? We define a richer model in which solutions may depend on who generates the surplus. In this model, the classical axiomatisation of the Shapley value fails: a broad family of solutions satisfy efficiency, anonymity, the dummy property, and additivity. Nevertheless, we obtain an axiomatisation of the Shapley value in the richer model by adding continuity and individual rationality to the original axioms.
