间接地缘经济影响：一种用于机制设计的切换动力系统框架
Indirect Geoeconomic Influence: A Switching Dynamical Systems Framework for Mechanism Design
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该研究提出切换动力系统框架分析间接地缘经济影响，通过操控政权过渡核设计机制，经模拟和盲审验证其用于生成高性能地缘经济影响机制的可行性。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
我们开发了一个用于分析间接地缘经济影响的形式化框架。影响国（发送方）不会试图直接改变目标国的政策，而是会重构目标国的内部政治经济，使其本国公民、企业和机构产生服从压力。该框架基于切换动力系统（SDS），其中目标国的政治经济在依赖模式的规则下演化。我们分析两种模式：允许模式，在该模式下，机制会向发送方偏好的政策传递压力；以及竞争模式，一旦目标国检测并归因于该机制，就会自然进入竞争模式。关键在于，发送方的机制设计会影响向竞争模式的过渡，而非为可识别性支付静态代价，这颠覆了常规的政权切换问题：设计人员无需从数据中估计潜在的过渡核，而是会在规划期内操控该核以引导政权占据情况。结构化切换向量沿离散设计维度分解任何机制，组合优化器会在该空间中搜索以服从度、阈值到达时间和耐用性比率为评分的高性能原型。我们刻画了模式条件均衡并推导了关于可信度和可识别性的比较静态，表明可识别性惩罚由政府渠道的显著性缩放，因此会与机制的成本分摊相互作用。我们用两种程式化机制说明该框架，报告了在简化切换空间上的概念验证模拟，并报告了对该流程可选语言模型生成阶段的小型盲审研究。
英文摘要
We develop a formal framework for analyzing indirect geoeconomic influence. The influencing state (sender) does not attempt to change a target nation's policy directly. Instead, the sender restructures the target's internal political economy so that its own citizens, firms, and institutions generate the compliance pressure. The framework rests on a switching dynamical system (SDS) in which a target's political economy evolves under mode-dependent rules. We analyze two modes: a permissive mode, in which a mechanism transmits pressure toward the sender's preferred policy, and a contested mode, entered naturally once the target detects and attributes the mechanism. Crucially, the sender's mechanism design shapes the transition into the contested mode rather than paying a static toll for legibility. This inverts the usual regime-switching problem: rather than estimating a latent transition kernel from data, the designer engineers the kernel to steer regime occupancy over a planning horizon. A structured switch vector decomposes any mechanism along discrete design dimensions, and a combinatorial optimizer searches this space for high-performing archetypes scored on compliance, time-to-threshold, and a durability ratio. We characterize mode-conditional equilibria and derive comparative statics on credibility and legibility, showing that the legibility penalty is scaled by the salience of the government channel and therefore interacts with the mechanism's cost incidence. We illustrate the framework with two stylized mechanisms, report a proof-of-concept simulation over a reduced switch space, and report a small blind-audit study of the pipeline's optional language-model generation stage.
