发表机构
Southwest University; University of Maribor; Community Healthcare Center Dr. Adolf Drolc Maribor; Korea University; Kyung Hee University; Centre for Energy Research（西南大学; 马里博尔大学; 阿道夫·德罗尔茨博士马里博尔社区医疗中心; 高丽大学; 庆熙大学; 能源研究中心）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究通过三方演化博弈模型发现，仅靠单边监管或市场激励无法遏制AI生成虚假信息，需协同监管奖惩、企业声誉损失及用户激励的政策组合实现有效治理。
AI 中文摘要
随着AI生成内容的快速传播，AI驱动的虚假信息日益普遍且难以治理，损害信息可信度与社会信任。本研究构建包含政府监管机构、AI企业和用户三方的演化博弈模型，纳入差异化奖惩机制，通过复制动态方程刻画竞争治理与生产策略的演化稳定性。分析表明，单边监管或单纯市场激励均无法有效遏制虚假信息，仅当监管奖惩强度、企业声誉损失及用户采用激励共同超过临界阈值时，才会形成真实信息生产的演化稳定机制。研究强调需制定协同自适应政策组合，使监管工具与企业行为、用户采纳相契合，同时管控治理成本。
英文摘要
With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.
Journal refHumanities and Social Sciences Communications (2026)
DOI：10.1057/s41599-026-08630-w
