策略异质性：脱离与移民的福利收益
Strategic Heterogeneity: Welfare Gains from Secession and Immigration
AI总结：
本文针对含从众者与反从众者的大群体匿名博弈，刻画纳什均衡集合，证明混合策略均衡存在帕累托改进的脱离方案，建立最优辖区设计与贝叶斯劝说的同构关系，推导迁移稳定性条件。
AI中文摘要：
本文研究具有策略异质性的大群体匿名博弈中内生人口划分（脱离）的策略与福利性质。我们考虑一个连续参与者框架，参与者分为两类：从众者（从一致性中获得正网络外部性）和反从众者（通过反一致性寻求独特性）。我们完整刻画了纳什均衡集合，确定了无成本脱离能产生帕累托改进的条件。我们证明，在任何策略混合社会中，每个混合策略纳什均衡都存在帕累托改进的脱离方案。当类型为有限个时，脱离会系统性缓解协调摩擦，提升个体收益与总效用。此外，我们刻画了优化加权总效用的社会规划者配置，建立了最优辖区设计与通过凹化求解的贝叶斯劝说理论之间的形式数学同构。最后，我们推导了当子群体可跨不同社会单边迁移时，迁移稳定性的结构条件。
英文摘要：
This paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogeneity. We consider a continuum-player framework with a binary action space where players are categorized either as fol- lowers, who experience positive network externalities from conformity, or as contrarians, who seek distinctiveness via anti-conformism. We fully characterize the set of Nash equilibria and establish con- ditions under which costless secession yields structural Pareto improvements. We demonstrate that in any strategically mixed society, every mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium admits a Pareto-improving se- cession. With finitely many types, secession systematically mitigates coordination frictions, enhancing both individual payoffs and aggregate utility. Furthermore, we characterize social planner configura- tions optimizing weighted aggregate utility, establishing a formal mathematical isomorphism between optimal jurisdictional design and the theory of Bayesian persuasion solved via concavification. Finally, we derive the structural conditions governing migration stability when subgroups can unilaterally re- locate across distinct societies.
