发表机构
NYU Tandon School of Engineering（纽约大学坦登工程学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文针对小芯片与LLM时代的硬件安全问题，分析了小芯片系统及LLM驱动EDA流水线的各类攻击，提出基于2.5D拆分制造与主动中介层的防御方法，还探讨了LLM对硬件安全的推动作用。
AI 中文摘要
半导体行业正经历双重革命：向异构2.5D小芯片系统的转型，以及将大语言模型（LLM）集成到电子设计自动化（EDA）流程中。这些范式虽在良率、模块化、设计生产力等方面带来前所未有的益处，却也大幅扩大了硬件攻击面。本文对这些前沿领域展开统一分析，涵盖从针对小芯片系统（包括用于LLM加速的硬件栈）在架构、逻辑和物理层面的攻击，到针对LLM驱动的EDA流水线的各类漏洞利用。为保障小芯片系统安全，本文回顾了一种强大的防御方法，即利用2.5D拆分制造与主动中介层构建物理隔离的信任根（RoT）架构。为保障LLM驱动的EDA流水线安全，本文先识别原生威胁，再综述最先进的防御技术。最后，本文探讨LLM系统如何推动包括小芯片在内的现代系统的硬件安全工作。
英文摘要
The semiconductor industry is undergoing a dual revolution: the shift toward heterogeneous 2.5D chiplet systems and the integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Electronic Design Automation (EDA) flows. While these paradigms offer unprecedented benefits in yield, modularity, design productivity, etc., they radically expand the hardware attack surface. This paper provides a unified analysis of these frontiers, ranging from attacks on chiplet systems (including hardware stacks for LLM acceleration) across architectural, logical, and physical levels, to various exploits against LLM-driven EDA pipelines. To secure chiplet systems, we review a powerful defense approach that leverages 2.5D split manufacturing and active interposers for physically isolated Root of Trust (RoT) architectures. To secure LLM-driven EDA pipelines, we first identify native threats and then review state-of-the-art defense techniques. Finally, we discuss how LLM systems can advance hardware security efforts for modern systems, including chiplets.
