发表机构
Toulouse School of Economics（图卢兹经济学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究发展社会中合作与攫取型政权的关系，提出文化维系的外部实践可纠正合作失败，揭示规模-份额楔子机制，还提出滚动履约保证金机制以保障相关实践的执行与改革。
AI 中文摘要
成功的合作可能会摧毁识别自身失败所需的实践。本文研究一个不断发展的社会，其中一项通用技术提高了产出，同时也增加了攫取型政权的风险，而一种由文化维系的外部实践则提供了纠正所需的反事实参照和运作能力。核心研究对象是用崩溃风险时间衡量的累积实践侵蚀。若侵蚀对规模的敏感性低于崩溃的敏感性，预期的纠正时间是有限的；若侵蚀的敏感性更高，则平均延迟是无限的；弹性相等时会产生精确的系数边界。然而，除非政治因素消除了外部实践，否则纠正几乎必然会发生。同一机制还会产生规模-份额楔子：增长可增加怀疑者群体和诊断性证据，同时怀疑者的政治份额却会消失，随后所有固定的非全体一致人口阈值都会在有限时间内被跨越。文化是认识资本的存量，而非不可替代的意识形态。一项维持完整外部实践的全额试点可复制该实践，但会产生资本化的执行与重建责任。在外部承诺下，取消时没收的滚动履约保证金为该责任提供资金，既阻止机会主义废除，又允许具有足够价值的改革取代损失的实验。
英文摘要
A common monetary standard can expand credit while weakening the alternative practices needed to recover from its failure and identify its cause. I study a growing credit economy in which safeguarded real settlements supply recovery capacity, matched observations for a reform decision, and apprenticeships in an alternative practice. The efficient reserve grows in absolute size but becomes a vanishing share of the economy. Protection based on a fixed population share therefore eventually fails, even along a path with expanding capacity and evidence. Voluntary cooperation provides only bounded readiness, while cheaper drills can preserve recovery without producing evidence. Apprenticeship and expected political survival reinforce one another, allowing exposed and protected continuations. I characterize protection indexed to the required service and the least-cost funding of replacement if the original institution is cancelled. The resulting arrangement combines verified procurement, training support when needed, and safe real collateral held by an outside custodian.
