发表机构
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev（内盖夫本-古里安大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究提出基于跨模态Transformer的补丁级风格计量防御，结合流式异常检测器，在真实供应链事件中高效检测软件仓库的作者冒充行为。
AI 中文摘要
软件供应链攻击日益利用身份缺口，即被入侵的维护者账户授权恶意变更。本研究评估补丁级作者身份验证作为一种行为防御层，表明风格计量分析不仅可在完整源文件上运行，还可在补丁级提交上运行。我们对跨模态Transformer在超过20年的Linux内核提交历史上进行微调，将代码差异和提交消息嵌入统一的风格计量空间，在开放世界作者身份验证中达到ROC AUC为0.93。随后我们将这些表示用于适用于持续集成与部署（CI/CD）设置的流式异常检测器。我们在涉及不同补丁特征的两起回顾性供应链事件上验证该流程：2021年PHP后门事件和2026年ForceMemo/GlassWorm活动。无需重新训练，所提出的检测器在维护者审核队列的约1%范围内检测到所有PHP伪造提交，且对28个可评分的ForceMemo伪造提交，每个仓库的中位数审查负担为0.8%。这些结果表明，跨模态补丁级嵌入可支持针对真实仓库中作者冒充的行为分类。
英文摘要
Software supply-chain attacks increasingly exploit an identity gap where compromised maintainer accounts authorize malicious changes. This work evaluates patch-level authorship verification as a behavioral defense layer, showing that stylometric analysis can operate not only on full source files but also on patch-level commits. We fine-tune a cross-modal transformer on more than 20 years of Linux kernel commit history to embed code diffs and commit messages into a unified stylometric space, achieving ROC AUC of 0.93 for open-world authorship verification. We then use these representations in a streaming anomaly detector suited to continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) settings. We validate the pipeline on two retrospective supply-chain incidents involving different patch characteristics: the 2021 PHP backdoor and the 2026 ForceMemo/GlassWorm campaign. Without retraining, the proposed detector surfaces both PHP forged commits within approximately 1% of the maintainer audit queue and ranks the 28 scoreable ForceMemo spoofs with a median per-repository review burden of 0.8%. These results indicate that cross-modal patch-level embeddings can support behavioral triage against author impersonation in real-world repositories.
