AI 中文总结
该研究区分预测市场中收益空间与协议可执行无套利，结合Polymarket数据测量套利利润，发现结算前转换强化效率，并扩展NegRisk适配器实现双向可执行路径。
AI 中文摘要
确定性收益恒等式意味着全有或全无预测市场存在无套利边界，但在结算前违反这些边界未必可被利用。我们区分了源于终端收益的收益空间无套利，以及依赖交易者可用头寸转换的协议可执行无套利。Polymarket的负风险市场使这一区分可被观测：关联二元市场代表互斥结果，而NegRisk适配器仅在结算前实现“否转是”方向。我们重建了感知深度的可执行投资组合价值，并结合行为者层面的交易历史与链上转换轨迹，以测量收益边界的违反情况及可利用空间。我们的重建估计，在两个实现渠道中存在112万美元的套利利润：108.6万美元来自转换器支持的策略，3.2万美元来自基于结算的篮子形成。在CLOB样本中，正违反集中于未被支持的“是”侧，而适配器支持的“否”侧违反频率显著更低且持续时间更短。这些模式与以下观点一致：结算前转换通过减少资本锁定并实现库存循环，强化了市场执行效率。最后，我们实现了NegRisk适配器的原型双向扩展，使反向路径在结算前可执行。综上，我们的发现表明，市场效率不仅取决于收益结构，还取决于协议是否将收益等价性作为可执行原语公开。
英文摘要
Deterministic payoff identities imply no-arbitrage bounds in winner-takes-all prediction markets, but violations of these bounds need not be exploitable before settlement. We distinguish payoff-space no-arbitrage, which follows from terminal payoffs, from protocol-executable no-arbitrage, which depends on the position transformations available to traders. Polymarket's negative-risk markets make this distinction observable: linked binary markets represent mutually exclusive outcomes, while the NegRisk Adapter operationalizes only the NO-to-YES direction before settlement. We reconstruct depth-aware executable portfolio values and combine them with actor-level transaction histories and on-chain conversion traces to measure payoff-bound violations and exploitation. Our reconstruction estimates \$1.12 million in arbitrage profit across two realization channels: \$1.086 million from converter-enabled strategies and \$32 thousand from settlement-based basket formation. In the CLOB sample, positive violations concentrate on the unsupported YES side, whereas adapter-supported NO-side violations are substantially less frequent and shorter-lived. These patterns are consistent with the view that pre-settlement conversion strengthens enforcement by reducing capital lock-up and enabling inventory recycling. Finally, we implement a prototype bidirectional extension of the NegRisk Adapter that makes the reverse path executable before settlement. Together, our findings show that market efficiency depends not only on payoff structure, but also on whether protocols expose payoff equivalences as executable primitives.
