AI 中文总结
Axient是面向多角色的场所无关链上信用协议，通过形式化架构与内生模型实现损失分配等机制，实验验证其分层保护等特性，为杠杆事件市场提供解决方案。
AI 中文摘要
实物支持的杠杆事件头寸需要真实信用：若抵押品C获得杠杆L，协议将提供(L-1)C并使用合计金额获取认可的事件敞口。本文为该资本层开发了场所无关的链上信用架构及其资本市场的内生模型，将角色划分为交易者、高级信用LP、做市商、清算者及清算后援提供者；形式化了池与债务份额、基于利用率和风险的利率、抵押品锁定头寸账户、场所能力、做市商承诺、提款队列、隔离池、不可赎回储备及确定性损失瀑布机制；并对内生提供者参与、杠杆需求、流动性提款、清算者进入、储备补充、挤兑及共同因素传染进行建模。形式化结果确立了实单位与整数单位会计的平衡、结算确认的债务优先级、交易者剩余所有权、幂等部分结算、非稀释性份额发行、次级优先于高级的减值、参与损失的提款队列、利用率均衡条件及损失分配与传染边界。该版本保留28个精确固定装置和31082个确定性检查，并添加了固定种子的基于智能体的实验，包含70207488个标量不变量评估且零失败。实验显示分层保护可降低但无法消除高级损失，5倍杠杆会显著增加资本压力，若准入扩张过快，做市商能力可能提高总缺口。这些结果是在作者指定行为下的合成机制比较，而非APY、违约、场所流动性或生产安全性的预测。
英文摘要
A physically backed leveraged event position requires real credit: if collateral C receives leverage L, the protocol supplies (L-1)C and uses the combined amount to acquire recognized event exposure. This paper develops a venue-agnostic on-chain credit architecture for that capital layer and an endogenous model of its capital market. It separates traders, Senior Credit LPs, market makers, liquidators, and Liquidation Backstop Providers; formalizes pool and debt shares, utilization- and risk-sensitive interest, collateral-locked position accounts, venue capabilities, market-maker commitments, withdrawal queues, isolated pools, non-redeemable reserves, and a deterministic loss waterfall; and models endogenous provider participation, leverage demand, liquidity withdrawal, liquidator entry, reserve replenishment, runs, and common-factor contagion. Formal results establish balanced real- and integer-unit accounting, settlement-confirmed debt priority, trader residual ownership, idempotent partial settlement, non-dilutive share issuance, junior-before-Senior impairment, loss-participating withdrawal queues, utilization-equilibrium conditions, and loss-allocation and contagion bounds. The release preserves 28 exact fixtures and 31,082 deterministic checks and adds fixed-seed agent-based experiments with 70,207,488 scalar invariant evaluations and zero failures. The experiments show that layered protection reduces but does not eliminate Senior loss, that 5x leverage materially increases capital pressure, and that market-maker capacity can raise aggregate shortfall if admission expands too quickly. Results are synthetic mechanism comparisons under author-specified behavior, not forecasts of APY, defaults, venue liquidity, or production safety.
Comments90 pages, 17 figures. Formal protocol design and fixed-seed synthetic agent-based validation; no live Axient or venue data
