AI 中文总结
本文针对具异质性ESG优先级的投资者构建基金模型，探讨冲突的ESG评级方法下的基金竞争，发现方法分歧使基金更专业化、趋同则提升参与度，共同敞口社会价值足够高时趋同可提升福利。
AI 中文摘要
相互竞争的ESG评级机构会奖励不同的投资组合属性。本文针对具有异质性ESG优先级的投资者，构建了选择投资组合和费用的基金模型。投资组合调整可同时提升两家机构的评分，或偏向其中一种方法，而投资者需求决定了每家基金所采用的方法。更大的分歧会使机构专属定位更具成效，但共同改进的成效会降低。因此，基金会更专业化，然而在基准均衡中，两家机构的评分、投资者参与度及均衡费用均会下降。投资者异质性创造了专业化带来的匹配收益，而共同改进支撑了基于持仓的ESG敞口。方法趋同会提升参与度和共同敞口，但削弱了投资者群体间的匹配。当共同敞口的社会价值足够高时，趋同会提升福利。
英文摘要
Competing ESG rating providers reward different portfolio attributes. This paper models funds that choose portfolios and fees for investors with heterogeneous ESG priorities. Portfolio changes can improve both providers' scores or favour one methodology over the other, and investor demand determines which methodology each fund targets. Greater disagreement makes provider-specific positioning more productive but common improvement less productive. Funds therefore specialise more, yet both provider scores, investor participation, and equilibrium fees fall in the benchmark equilibrium. Investor heterogeneity creates matching gains from specialisation, while common improvement supports holdings-based ESG exposure. Methodology convergence improves participation and common exposure but weakens matching across investor clienteles. Convergence raises welfare when the social value of common exposure is sufficiently high.
