委托式公平分配
Delegated Fair Division
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该研究针对委托式公平分配模型，区分两种信息结构并提供高效算法，生成同时满足中心与代理人层面基于嫉妒的公平性保证的分配方案。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
受最近提出的委托资源分配问题启发，我们研究一种公平分配模型：将一组不可分商品分配给若干代理人，每个代理人隶属于某个更大的中心实体。该模型涵盖了向组织单位分配资源并由其分发给下属成员的通用框架，一个极具社会意义的相关应用是慈善组织对食品捐赠的分配。本质上，每个中心作为其所属代理人的代表，协调他们通常不同的偏好。我们的目标是分配商品，使其在中心和代理人层面同时满足公平性要求。我们根据代理人是将自身 bundle 与所有代理人比较，还是仅与同一中心的代理人比较，区分两种不同的信息结构。针对每种结构，我们提供高效算法，可生成在两个层面均满足基于嫉妒的公平性保证的分配方案。
英文摘要
Motivated by recently introduced problems on delegated resource allocation, we study a model of fair division, where a set of indivisible goods is to be allocated to some agents, each of which belonging to some bigger central entity. Our model captures the general framework of allocating resources to organizational units, which subsequently distribute them to their affiliated members. A particularly relevant application of this framework, with immense social impact, arises in the allocation of food donations through charitable organizations. In essence, every center acts as the representative of the agents belonging to it, aligning their generally different preferences. Our goal is to distribute the goods in a way that is simultaneously fair both with respect to the centers and the agents. We distinguish two different information structures depending on whether the agents compare their bundles against every agent or only those belonging to the same center. For each one of them we provide efficient algorithms that produce allocations that satisfy envy-based fairness guarantees at both levels.
