离婚改革如何促使已婚夫妇增加劳动供给
How Divorce Reforms Induced Married Couples to Supply More Labor
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文研究美国离婚立法从TBR转向EDR对已婚夫妇劳动供给的影响，发现EDR使双方增加劳动供给，女性增幅占过去70年女性劳动参与率总上升的30%，还构建模型分析其福利影响。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
本文研究离婚立法对已婚夫妇劳动供给行为及福利的动态影响。利用美国家庭面板数据，笔者考察了从20世纪70年代的“基于所有权的制度”（Title-based Regime，TBR）向80年代的“公平分配制度”（Equitable Distribution Regime，EDR）的转变。在前者制度下，婚姻财产依据正式所有权分割，配偶可在事前承诺离婚时的未来财产分配。转向EDR后，法院更公平地分割婚姻财产，这与家庭不确定性产生两种相互作用：其一，因法院决定财产分割，家庭无法再承诺未来财产分配；其二，因法院判决并非完全可预测，该政策引入了新的不确定性来源。基于这些原因，EDR增强了配偶双方通过工作积累预防性储蓄以自我保障的动机。笔者采用交错双重差分设计，实证证实已婚男性和女性均因政策变化增加了劳动供给，女性的增幅相当于过去70年女性劳动力参与率总上升幅度的30%。为合理化并理解实证证据的福利含义，笔者构建并估计了一个包含家庭劳动供给、储蓄和离婚的动态模型，利用该估计模型表明，EDR可能在配偶婚姻存续期间就无意间降低了双方的福利。
英文摘要
This paper studies the dynamic effects of divorce legislation on the labor supply behavior and welfare of married couples. Using U.S. household panel data, I examine the transition from the "Title-based Regime" (TBR) in the 1970s to the "Equitable Distribution Regime" (EDR) in the 1980s. Under the former regime, marital assets are split based on formal ownership rights, allowing spouses to commit ex ante to a future asset allocation in the event of divorce. The shift to EDR, where courts more equitably divide marital assets, interacted in two ways with household uncertainty. First, because the court chooses the division of assets, households can no longer commit to a future asset allocation. Second, because the court's decision is not fully predictable, the policy introduces a new source of uncertainty. For these reasons, EDR increased the incentives for both spouses to self-insure by working to accumulate precautionary savings during marriage. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design, I confirm empirically that both married men and women increased labor supply in response to the policy change, with the women's increase equal to 30% of the total rise in female labor force participation over the last 70 years. To rationalize and understand the welfare implications of the empirical evidence, I develop and estimate a dynamic model of household labor supply, savings, and divorce. I use the estimated model to show that EDR may have inadvertently reduced the welfare of both spouses even while married.
