AI 中文总结
本文提出合作博弈框架，将异构运营商联合投资公共基础设施的问题建模为可转移效用合作博弈，重构为线性生产博弈实现稳定剩余分配，并结合数据中心运营商共享可再生能源基础设施的案例验证。
AI 中文摘要
本文提出了一种在监管激励下用于共享基础设施可持续联合投资的合作博弈论框架。多个异构运营商共同投资于一项生产能力随时间演变且受运营变异性影响的公共基础设施，监管机构通过激励机制支持该设施部署，旨在协调个体经济投资目标与联盟整体目标。我们将联合投资问题建模为可转移效用（TU）合作博弈，其中合作产生的价值取决于异构运营状况、动态资源可用性、投资成本及监管激励水平。研究表明，所提合作博弈可重构为线性生产博弈（LPG），其对偶价格能生成具有建设性且稳定的合作剩余分配方案。最后，我们通过一个案例研究说明所提框架，该案例涉及数据中心运营商在共享可再生能源基础设施中的联合投资，并有政府补贴推动可再生能源消费提供支持。
英文摘要
This paper proposes a cooperative game-theoretic framework for sustainable co-investment in shared infrastructure under regulatory incentives. Multiple heterogeneous operators co-invest in a common infrastructure whose production capability evolves over time and is subject to operational variability. A regulator supports the deployment through incentive mechanisms designed to align individual economic investment objectives with the coalitional one. We formulate the co-investment problem as a transferable-utility (TU) coalitional game in which the value generated by cooperation depends on heterogeneous operational profiles, dynamic resource availability, investment costs, and regulatory incentive level. We show that the proposed coalitional game can be reformulated as a linear production game (LPG), whose dual prices yield a constructive and stable allocation of the cooperative surplus. Finally, we illustrate the proposed framework through a case study on co-investment among data center operators in shared renewable energy infrastructure, supported by government subsidies promoting renewable energy consumption.
Journal refThe 13th International Conference on Networks, Games, Control and Optimization (NETGCOOP), Oct 2026, Palermo (Italy), Italy
