发表机构
The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics（阿卜杜斯·萨拉姆国际理论物理中心）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
探讨零和博弈中的开放式创新，创新过程建模为从分布中抽取新策略，研究表明一般条件下会引发永无休止的创新军备竞赛，因一方引入新技术会增加对手创新边际效用。
AI 中文摘要
本笔记讨论具有开放式创新的零和博弈，其中每个参与者都可引入新策略。创新过程被建模为从一种分布中抽取新策略。有人认为，在一般条件下，这种设定会导致一场永无休止的创新军备竞赛，因为一方引入新技术会增加对手进行技术创新的边际效用。
英文摘要
This note discusses zero-sum games with open-ended innovation, whereby each player may introduce new strategies. The innovation process is modelled as a draw of new strategies form a distribution. It is argued that, when the cost of innovation is vanishingly small, this setting can lead to an everlasting innovation arm-race. In particular, the introduction of new technologies of the advanced player increases the marginal utility for technological innovation of the backward one, whereas innovation of the backward player disincentivizes the more advanced one to innovate.
Comments5 pages, 1 figures
