AI 中文总结
研究旨在设计降低市场效率的干预措施，通过网络实验发现部分交付中断可有效降低市场效率，卖家受损，市场集中度增加，攻击卖家评级则无效，为扰乱非法市场政策研究提供思路。
AI 中文摘要
经济学中的市场设计研究自然聚焦于提高市场效率。本文目标相反，即设计使市场效率降低的干预措施。研究受在线非法市场增长启发，因其效率降低或能减少社会危害。通过网络实验发现，部分交付中断是降低市场效率的有效方法，卖家销售商品减少、收入降低。但交付中断会使市场集中度增加，因有助于主导卖家出现。而攻击卖家评级对降低市场效率无效。该研究为基于证据、因果驱动的调查提供了思路，以协助制定扰乱网络犯罪及其他非法市场的政策。
英文摘要
Market design research in economics naturally focusses on how to improve market efficiency. Our objective here is exactly the opposite - how to design interventions that make a market less efficient. Our research is inspired by the growth of illicit markets online where reducing their efficiency may reduce societal harm. Using a web-based experiment, we find that a partial disruption to delivery is an effective method to decrease market efficiency. The decrease is borne by sellers who sell fewer goods and have lower earnings. A consequence of a disruption to delivery, however, is an increase in market concentration because it facilitates the emergence of a dominant seller. In contrast, we find that attacks on seller ratings are ineffective at reducing market efficiency. This study paves the way for evidence-based, causally driven investigations to aid policies to disrupt cybercrime and other illicit markets.
