发表机构
Toronto Metropolitan University; Flybits Labs; MIT Media Lab（多伦多都会大学; Flybits实验室; 麻省理工学院媒体实验室）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究跨域边界最小必要披露问题，提出“来源保留编年史”协议，通过编译持有者编年史为授权证据子图，遵循“按需共享”规则，保持本地主权并分阶段返回数据，实现安全披露上下文。
AI 中文摘要
现代人工智能系统带来如大规模监控、权力极度集中和用户自主权丧失等社会风险，质疑了第三方收集和控制大量用户数据的模式。用户需要一个主权系统来安全地拥有、管理和披露其上下文，同时在受监管领域保持合规。视角感知人工智能通过将用户聚合的个人数据转换为称为“编年史”的结构化身份模型来实现这一点。本文探讨跨域边界的最小必要披露问题，提出了“来源保留编年史”（PPC）协议，该协议将每个持有者的编年史编译成一个紧凑的“授权证据子图”，遵循“按需共享”规则，保持持有者本地主权，通过访问控制器投影关系感知视图，分两阶段返回与来源相关的文本，仅在持有者明确批准后才释放原始工件。
英文摘要
Modern AI systems bring societal risks such as mass surveillance, extreme concentrations of power, and loss of user autonomy---calling into question a model where third-parties collect and control massive amounts of user data. Users require a sovereign system to securely own, govern, and disclose their context while remaining compliant across regulated domains with strict provenance, interpretability, and policy adherence. Perspective-aware AI approaches this by transforming a user's aggregated personal data into a structured identity model called a \emph{Chronicle}: a temporal knowledge graph that represents and grows with the user. Chronicles support the secure disclosure of context across federated networks. A Chronicle holder may expose a queryable, authorized view that a third-party agent may consult without centralizing anyone's data. This paper explores the problem of minimum-necessary disclosure across domain boundaries: when a requester's agent queries a Chronicle, how can the system constrain its response to release only what the requester's relationship, stated purpose, and specific task require? We propose \textbf{Provenance Preserving Chronicles} (PPC), a federated protocol that compiles each holder's Chronicle into a compact \emph{authorized evidence subgraph} governed by one rule: \emph{share no more than the request requires}. Holders keep local sovereignty; an access controller projects relationship-aware views over domain-expert ontologies; and a two-phase flow returns provenance-linked text first, releasing raw artifacts only after explicit holder approval. We frame the problem, map gaps in blockchain, P2P, and holder-sovereign designs, define the core constructs, and sketch the protocol with an explicit threat model.
