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可问责的交易包含列表:增强以太坊的抗审查能力

Accountable Transaction Inclusion Lists: Enhancing Ethereum's Censorship Resistance

Patrick Spiesberger, Hannes Hartenstein

arXiv 2607.22040首次发表:更新:

AI 中文总结

研究以太坊交易延迟及审查问题,提出FairFIL机制,要求构建者公布审查交易,委员会验证后后续构建者须包含,否则 forfeiting 奖励,经行为模型证明其合理性,主网评估显示多区块审查成本增加,保留构建者MEV提取自由度且内存池一致性可实现。

AI 中文摘要

在以太坊中,交易是否被包含很少有问题,关键在于包含的延迟。目前,区块构建者可在连续区块中进行审查,威胁到如链上拍卖等对时间敏感的应用。现有提案FOCIL虽安排在2026年底部署,但委员会成员对交易实际包含情况无需负责,对手可用低价贿赂委员会忽略交易。本文认为问责制能大幅提高审查成本,为此提出公平向前包含列表(FairFIL)作为以太坊的可问责抗审查机制。在FairFIL中,每个构建者须按协议政策公布其选择审查的所有交易,委员会验证披露的完整性和有效性,后续构建者必须包含这些交易,否则 forfeiting 全块奖励。通过行为模型证明所有参与者遵守该机制是理性的。以太坊主网的实证评估表明,多区块审查成本比现有提案高出一个数量级,同时很大程度上保留了构建者的MEV提取自由度,初步测量还表明FairFIL所需的内存池一致性在实践中可实现。

英文摘要

In Ethereum, transaction inclusion is rarely in question; what matters is the delay until inclusion. Currently, block builders could exercise censorship across consecutive blocks, threatening time-critical applications, such as on-chain auctions. To mitigate this risk, existing proposals such as FOCIL, scheduled for deployment in late 2026, assign a committee to list transactions for mandatory inclusion. However, no committee member is held accountable for the actual inclusion of the transactions: an adversary can bribe the entire committee to omit any transaction for less than 2 Euro per block under current conditions. We argue that accountability, i.e., requiring all exclusion decisions to be publicly disclosed and verifiably complete, with violations attributable to a specific party, substantially raises censorship costs. To this end, we propose Fair Forward Inclusion Lists (FairFIL) as an accountable censorship resistance mechanism for Ethereum. In FairFIL, every builder must publish all transactions the builder chooses to censor, subject to a protocol-anchored policy; a committee verifies the completeness and validity of this disclosure. The subsequent builder must include these transactions, forfeiting the full block reward upon any omission. Therefore, under FairFIL, extending censorship beyond a single slot requires an assembler to forfeit a full block reward. We show that compliance is rational for all participants within our behavior model. Our empirical evaluation on Ethereum mainnet indicates that multi-block censorship costs one order of magnitude more than under existing proposals, while leaving the builder's MEV extraction freedom largely intact. Initial measurements further suggest that the mempool consistency FairFIL requires is met in practice.

Comments29 pages, 3 figures

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